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Non-technical Summary
The European Central Bank (ECB) implements monetary policy by conducting
open market operations to steer the short term interest rates in the interbank
market, managing the liquidity situation in the market and signalling the monetary
policy stance. In particular, the euro overnight rate, the market interest rate that
is most closely linked to the policy rate, is crucial for signalling the policy stance
since the overnight rate marks the first step in the monetary policy transmission
process. Therefore, it is desirable for the ECB to keep the EONIA in close distance
to the policy rate.
The spread between the EONIA and the ECB’s policy rate has widened slowly
but steadily since the introduction of the changes to the operational framework
in March 2004. The widening has become particularly remarkable since autumn
2005. While a modest spread between the EONIA and the MBR is not of general
concern for monetary policy, a large spread could blur the message of the stance
of monetary policy. To limit the increase in the spread, the ECB adopted a loose
liquidity policy towards the end of the year 2005. The spread decreased somewhat
during 2006 while increasing again towards the end of the year.
The analysis identifies possible driving forces underlying the evolution of the spread
over time and aims to quantify the impact of specific factors on the observed
upward shift. In particular, we estimate a model on the spread between the EONIA
and the ECB’s policy rate from March 2004 until August 2006 (”new” framework
period). Factors related to the liquidity supply of the ECB and the liquidity needs
of the banking sector are of particular interest with regard to the determination of
the overnight market interest rate are. Uncertainty about liquidity conditions and
banks’ expectations on future interest rates may also be related to the equilibrium
in the overnight market. More generally, however, the dynamics of the EONIA
might be affected by the way the ECB implements its monetary policy. In this
regard, we perform a separate estimation for the period before the changes to the
operational framework from June 2000 to March 2004 (”old” framework period).
This enables us to compare the impact of certain factors on the EONIA in the new
versus the old framework period.
Our empirical results provide evidence that the increase of the EONIA spread
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in the new framework period can for the largest part be explained by the cur-
rent liquidity deficit. Moreover, tight liquidity conditions as well as an increase
in banks’ uncertainty about the liquidity conditions lead to a significant upward
pressure on the EONIA spread. ECB’s liquidity policy only has a significant im-
pact on the reduction of the spread if a loose policy is conducted during the last
week of an MRO. Interestingly, policy rate expectations have not been found to
have an important influence. Furthermore, our results show that the changes to
the framework in March 2004 might be of relevance to the interaction between
the explanatory variables and the EONIA spread. This conclusion follows from
comparing the estimation results of both framework periods. In particular, banks
reacted less sensitively to the overall liquidity deficit, liquidity conditions within
the maintenance period and liquidity uncertainty in the period of the old com-
pared to the new framework, i.e. before and after the changes to the operational
framework in March 2004. On the contrary, interest rate expectations clearly play
a more important role for the behaviour of banks before March 2004.
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1 Introduction
The European Central Bank (ECB) implements monetary policy by conducting
open market operations to steer the short term interest rates in the interbank
market, managing the liquidity situation in the market and signalling the mon-
etary policy stance. In particular, the daily interest rate in the interbank mar-
ket, the Euro Over Night Index Average (EONIA), the interest rate that is most
closely linked to the policy rate, is crucial for signalling the policy stance since the
overnight rate marks the first step in the monetary policy transmission process.
Therefore, it is desirable for the ECB to keep the EONIA in close distance to the
policy rate.
The ECB has in general proved successful in steering interest rates using its policy
instruments. In particular, the volatility of the interbank overnight rate, EONIA,
has been low on average within the euro area and the spread between the EONIA
and the ECB’s policy rate, i.e. the minimum bid rate (MBR) in the main refi-
nancing operations (MROs) has also been rather moderate. However, the spread
between the EONIA rate and the ECB’s policy rate (EONIA spread) has steadily
widened since the introduction of the changes to the operational framework in
March 2004.1 The widening has become particularly remarkable since autumn
2005. While a modest spread between the EONIA and the MBR is not of general
concern for monetary policy, a large spread could blur the message of the stance
of monetary policy and, in extreme cases, may inhibit the ECB’s ability to steer
the overnight rate. Such a loss of control over the short end of the yield curve
may obscure the transmission of monetary policy and potentially have large costs
in terms of credibility and commitment to the central bank.
This paper explores the determinants of the EONIA spread to explain the ob-
served widening of the EONIA spread. In particular, we estimate a model of the
EONIA spread from March 2004 (introduction of the changes to the operational
framework) until August 2006 (”new” framework period). The analysis identifies
possible driving forces underlying the evolution of the spread over time and aims
1See ECB (2003).
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to quantify the impact of specific factors on the observed upward shift. Factors
related to the liquidity supply of the ECB and the liquidity needs of the banking
sector are of particular interest with regard to the determination of the overnight
market interest rate are. Uncertainty about liquidity conditions and banks’ ex-
pectations on future interest rates may also be related to the equilibrium in the
overnight market. More generally, however, the dynamics of the EONIA might be
affected by the way the ECB implements its monetary policy. In this regard, we
perform a separate estimation for the period before the changes to the operational
framework from June 2000 to March 2004 (”old” framework period).2 This enables
us to compare the impact of certain factors on the EONIA in the new versus the
old framework period.
A few other studies have explored the EONIA rate and the link to the operational
framework from various perspectives. Pe´rez Quiro´s and Rodr´ıguez Mendiza´bal
(2006) point to the importance of the deposit and lending facilities as tools to
stabilize the overnight rate within a theoretical model on reserve averaging. Nautz
and Offermanns (2007a) show that the introduction of variable rate tenders in
June 2000 did not lead to a loss of control of the ECB over the EONIA. Wu¨rtz
(2003) proposes a comprehensive model on the EONIA spread in levels and its
volatility. The contribution of our paper to this literature is to present a model of
the structural determinants of the EONIA spread and to quantify the impact of
these underlying driving forces on the increase of the EONIA spread.
Our empirical results provide evidence that the increase of the EONIA spread
in the new framework period can for the largest part be explained by a trend-
ing liquidity deficit. Moreover, tight liquidity conditions as well as an increase
in banks’ uncertainty about the liquidity conditions lead to a significant upward
pressure on the EONIA spread. ECB’s liquidity policy only has a significant im-
pact on the reduction of the spread if a loose policy is conducted during the last
week of an MRO. Interestingly, policy rate expectations have not been found to
have an important influence. Furthermore, our results show that the changes to
2Since June 2000, the ECB has been conducting its open market operations in a variable rate
tender format.
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the framework in March 2004 might be of relevance to the interaction between
the explanatory variables and the EONIA spread. This conclusion follows from
comparing the estimation results of both framework periods. In particular, banks
reacted less sensitively to the overall liquidity deficit, liquidity conditions within
the maintenance period and liquidity uncertainty in the old compared to the new
framework period, i.e. before and after the changes to the operational framework
in March 2004. On the contrary, interest rate expectations clearly play a more
important role for the behaviour of banks before March 2004.
The following section provides some stylized facts about the EONIA spread, Sec-
tion 3 presents the possible determinants of the EONIA spread and how the
changes to the operational framework might have influenced the relation between
the basic determinants and the EONIA spread. Section 4 presents our empiri-
cal model and the results. Section 5 makes a conclusion and points to possible
implications for monetary policy.
2 Stylized Facts
With regard to the perspective of signalling the monetary policy stance, the EO-
NIA should move in close distance to the minimum bid rate. A slightly positive
spread seems natural, because the marginal rate3 of MROs normally lies above the
minimum bid rate. Factors that are related to banks’ bidding behaviour in MROs
can influence this component of the EONIA spread. In addition, a positive dif-
ference between the EONIA and the marginal rate emerges because open market
operations with the ECB are subject to strict collateral requirements whereas the
EONIA is calculated from unsecured transactions. Thus, risk premia are reflected
in the spread, too. However, a reverse effect should come from the differing matu-
rities of the MROs (maturity of one or two weeks) and the overnight rate. Figure 1
illustrates the evolution of the EONIA and the minimum bid rate for the complete
sample period. As Figure 2 shows more in detail, the spread has steadily widened
3The marginal rate is the the stop-out rate of the tender, i.e. the lowest rate at which allotment
still takes place.
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since the introduction of the new framework in March 2004. This became particu-
larly visible in autumn 2005. The spread then stabilized towards the end of 2005,
decreased slightly during 2006 but increased again towards the end of 2006. Table
1 summarizes these developments from June 2000 to August 2006. The widening
of the spread is more clearly reflected by the median values since — contrary to
the means — they are not biased by outliers, which are more pronounced in the
old framework period from June 2000 to March 2004 than in the new framework
period.4
Figure 1: EONIA, minimum bid rate and their spread, complete sample
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The vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the new framework.
Figure 2: EONIA, minimum bid rate and liquidity policy in the new framework period
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4In particular, outliers have been less strong since autumn 2005, when the ECB started to
conduct fine tuning operations (FTOs) on the last day of the period.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics EONIA spread
Time period Mean Median
Complete sample June 2000 to August 2006 7.2 bp 6.0 bp
Old framework June 2000 to March 2004 7.6 bp 5.0 bp
New framework March 2004 to August 2006 6.7 bp 8.0 bp
New framework, first part March 2004 to August 2005 5.7 bp 6.0 bp
New framework, second part September 2005 to August 2006 7.7 bp 8.0 bp
3 The Determinants of the EONIA Spread:
Theoretical Predictions
An obvious candidate for explaining movements in the EONIA spread is the in-
teraction of liquidity supply and demand factors which determines the liquidity
situation in the overnight market. Essentially, tender operations are the main
opportunity where liquidity supply by the ECB and liquidity demand by counter-
parties meet. As such, a focal point of our study are tender operations, including
(i) the ECB’s liquidity supply and (ii) refinancing needs of commercial banks, but
also (iii) variables that are likely to influence liquidity demand of ECB counter-
parties such as interest rate expectations.
The design of the operational framework governs the outcome of the open mar-
ket operations and should in principle be reflected in banks’ bidding behaviour in
open market operations and therefore affect the interbank market equilibrium.5
In consequence, when identifying the determinants of the spread, it is important
to relate movements of the spread to the changes in the institutional framework.
Such exogenous changes can influence the relationship between the basic deter-
minants and the spread. Their analysis should therefore help to identify sources
of the widening of the spread.6 The changes in the operational framework as of
5See Linzert and Weller (2006) for panel econometric evidence on the determinants of banks
bidding behaviour in ECB’s MROs. See also Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004), Linzert,
Nautz and Breitung (2006) and Linzert, Nautz and Bindseil (2007) for further studies on banks’
bidding behaviour in central bank auctions.
6Hassler and Nautz (2007) confirm the ECB’s control over the EONIA during the period of
variable rate tenders. But they find that the influence of the ECB on the EONIA has weakened
slightly since the introduction of the changes to the operational framework in March 2004.
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March 2004 primarily relate to institutional parameters and to both information
and transparency issues. In particular, the institutional changes in March 2004
consisted in reducing the tender period in MROs from two weeks to one week and
in changing the timing of the reserve maintenance period such that the start of a
reserve maintenance period now coincides with the settlement day of an MRO. In
addition, this is the day on which interest rate decisions become effective.
Liquidity supply
To prevent the EONIA spread from widening, the ECB started to use the liquidity
provision in MROs as a more structural policy instrument in October 2005. To
measure liquidity supply in MROs, we define a variable liquidity policy as the dif-
ference between actual allotment and benchmark allotment, which would ensure
a neutral liquidity situation during the tender period. It seems obvious, that a
higher than benchmark allotment creates relatively abundant liquidity conditions
and therefore should reduce the spread. However, the benchmark allotment takes
into account accumulated liquidity imbalances and thus ”reverses”the liquidity pol-
icy of the previous MRO. That means, if liquidity supply was loose in the previous
allotment, there is a liquidity imbalance meaning that liquidity supply is higher
than what would be compatible with neutral conditions. Thus, the subsequent
benchmark allotment is lower compared to a preceding neutral allotment and only
the liquidity policy in the last MRO of a maintenance period decides about the
liquidity character of all MROs within a maintenance period. This means only
if the actual allotment in the last MRO is higher than the benchmark allotment,
total liquidity supply in the period has been higher than necessary for neutral liq-
uidity conditions. Consequently, our hypothesis to be examined, is that liquidity
policy has a negative effect on the EONIA spread — due to the reserve averaging
— only prevail in the last MRO of a maintenance period.7
7Results from previous work such as Moschitz (2004), Ejerskov et al. (2003) or Wu¨rtz (2003)
also suggest that variables related to the ECB’s liquidity supply are relevant only in the last
week of a maintenance period. Moschitz (2004) divides his variables according to its expected
persistence within the period. He finds that liquidity variables that only represent temporary
changes do not affect the spread whereas shocks assumed to be permanent do.
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A further liquidity supply instrument are fine tuning operations (FTOs). They are
mainly used to smooth out short-term liquidity fluctuations of large scale. FTOs
were only very rarely applied under the old framework. In the new framework
period they have been used increasingly in a systematic way to assure banks that
there will be no liquidity shortages on the last day of the period. Such a concern
might lead banks to keep back reserves in order not to run out of liquidity on the
last day. To find out whether this more systematic implementation of FTOs has
influenced banks’ expectations about an FTO and thereby their liquidity manage-
ment within the period of the new framework, we examine if additional liquidity
supply via an FTO in the previous period mitigates the EONIA spread in the
current period.
Figure 3: Time frame for the operational steps in standard tenders
 
Monday    Tuesday    Wednesday
3.30 p.m.    9.30 a.m.         Settlement 
Tender     Deadline          of transactions 
announcement   bid submission 
    
       10.00 - 11.20 a.m. 
Announcement  
and allotment  
       of tender results 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Source: ECB, The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area, Sep. 2006. 
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Liquidity needs
Liquidity needs of counterparties basically arise from two sources: reserve require-
ments and autonomous factors, see Figure 4.8 When making the allotment decision
in MROs, the ECB takes both reserve requirements and forecasts of autonomous
factors into account.
Figure 4: Simplified balance sheet of the Eurosystem
Simplified balance sheet of the Eurosystem (1 March 2002) 
(EUR billions; references to the corresponding items in the Eurosystem’s weekly financial statement are provided in brackets) 
 
Assets Liabilities 
Autonomous liquidity factors  Autonomous liquidity factors  
Net foreign asstes (A1+A2+A3-L7-L8-L9) 387.1 Banknotes in circulation (L1) 285.8 
 Government deposits (L5.1) 57.2 
 Other autonomous factors (net) 92.1 
  435.1 
   
 
Current account holdings – covering 
the minimum reserve system (L2.1) 
134.9 
   
Monetary policy instruments Monetary policy instruments  
Main refinancing operations (A5.1) 123.0   
Longer-term refinancing operations (A5.2) 60.0   
Marginal Lending facility (A5.5) 0.0 Deposit facility (L2.2) 0.0 
 570.1  570.1 
 
Notes: Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin May 2002. 
On the basis of autonomous factors forecasts entering the ECB’s benchmark al-
lotment, we construct a variable that captures the cumulated average shocks in
autonomous factors since the preceding MRO.9 If autonomous factors during a
tender period are higher than assumed in the benchmark allotment calculation,
the liquidity situation is relatively tight and should lead to pressure on the EONIA
spread. The informational content of this variable consists primarily in measuring
8Autonomous factors include banknotes in circulation, government deposits, net foreign assets
or other balance sheet items of the ECB that are neither monetary policy operations nor current
account holdings of the ECB’s counterparties. As Figure 4 shows, liabilities from autonomous
factors are higher than autonomous factors on the asset side, implying a net liquidity deficit
of autonomous factors for commercial banks. Whereas reserve requirements are constant for a
maintenance period, autonomous factors are out of the control of the ECB and subject to daily
variations.
9We use cumulated averages because ECB-forecasts refer to average autonomous factors for
any day of the tender period, i.e. the relevant information set refers to the allotment Tuesday of
an MRO. Cumulating takes into account how conditions have changed since then on average of
each day.
8
the degree of unexpected tightening in the market that may be due to liquidity
shocks on the one hand or to imprecise forecasts by the ECB on the other hand.
Due to a higher transparency in the publication of autonomous factors and bench-
mark allotment, banks’ perception the forecasts of autonomous factors should be
clearer under the new framework compared to the old framework. Given this pre-
sumption, the market should react in a more precise and timely manner to changes
in daily conditions of autonomous factors. In brief, we examine if (i) higher than
forecasted autonomous factors lead to an upward pressure on the EONIA spread
and if (ii) the market’s reaction in the new framework period is stronger.
To measure banks’ liquidity needs, we further use the cumulated average reserve
fulfilments since the beginning of the maintenance period. We take cumulated
averages because the reserve averaging mechanism allows banks to smooth their
reserve fulfilments within a maintenance period. If past reserve fulfilment has been
high on average, future reserve pressure in the current maintenance period is low.
Thus, we would expect a negative sign of this variable on the EONIA spread.10
Since the changes that were made to the operational framework in March 2004,
there have been no more overlaps of maintenance periods. Therefore banks are
forced to obtain sufficient liquidity during the maintenance period to fulfil their
reserve requirements. This might induce banks to develop specific preferences over
the reserve fulfilment path. In particular, if banks face the risk of receiving no
liquidity in the last tender of the maintenance period they may find it preferable
to front-load the fulfilment of the average reserve requirements. If banks prefer to
front-load their reserve requirements instead of fulfilling them smoothly, a positive
tender spread may emerge, particularly within the maintenance period.
10Wu¨rtz (2003) includes a similar variable, finding only a negligible effect on the EONIA spread.
Moschitz (2004) develops a theoretical model of the intertemporal decision making problem in
the supply of and demand for reserves. He concentrates on reserves as crucial liquidity need,
pointing to the fact that shocks in autonomous factors directly affect the reserve position as
long as the ECB’s liquidity supply is given. However, in our context, even given the ECB’s
liquidity supply, a bank, being confronted to a shock in autonomous factors, may try to cover
the additional liquidity needs from the interbank market, i.e. increasing its demand on the market
and thus driving the spread upwards. Thus, we consider it to be of importance to model both
sources of liquidity needs.
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Bidding in MROs
With regard to liquidity supply in the context of the operational framework, it
turns out that MROs are the main source for liquidity, providing a bulk of 75 per-
cent of all interbank money, which makes them the dominant instrument to direct
the overnight interest rate. Against this background the question arises whether
the EONIA rate is driven by the outcome of the ECB’s MROs, i.e. the marginal
rate from this operation. This would imply that factors governing the auction
outcome would automatically have an impact on the EONIA as well. These are
factors on the demand side that have been found to be crucially important for
determining banks’ bidding behaviour in ECB’s MROs. That is why we intro-
duce several variables that record bidding behaviour or that may influence bidding
behaviour in MROs.
The first variable in this context is the bid-to-cover ratio, defined as the ratio be-
tween total bid volume and the amount covered. This variable reflects to what
degree the demand of banks has been met by the ECB. A high bid-to-cover ratio
signals that demand for central bank money has only been satisfied to a low degree
by the ECB. Thus, banks have to rely stronger on the interbank market to obtain
the necessary liquidity. Prior to March 2004, when liquidity was obtained by over-
lapping two-week operations, banks always enjoyed a ”liquidity buffer” provided
by their allotment in the previous week. Being denied this buffer, concerns about
receiving an allotment of desired size in each operation may have risen. Therefore,
banks may dislike the uncertainty surrounding their allotment, and consequently
bid more aggressively, i.e. placing bids above the expected marginal rate to increase
the certainty of their pro-rata allotment. If many banks follow this strategy, an
upward trend in the tender spread could become self-sustaining. Therefore, we
include the bid-to-cover ratio to test if there is a positive relationship with the
EONIA spread and in particular, if its influence is stronger in the new framework
period.
Given banks’ uncertainty about the actual allotment, the marginal cost of the risk
of receiving no liquidity in the tender is likely to increase with the size of banks’
desired liquidity. Therefore, bidding at higher rates to secure allotment will likely
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increase in the bid volume. If the refinancing volume for banks is high, going
out empty-handed from an open market operation, i.e. the exposure to the risk of
obtaining smaller than expected allotment amounts may be more serious compared
to a situation of moderate refinancing needs. In this sense, obtaining lower than
expected allotments becomes more costly the larger allotment and bid volumes
are. Consequently, banks insure themselves by bidding at higher rates to avoid
unexpected rationing.
This hypothesis is formally underpinned by Neyer and Wiemers (2004) or Va¨lima¨ki
(2006). Va¨lima¨ki develops a model of the individual bank’s allotment demand
in MROs with a variable rate character in the cases of allotment certainty and
uncertainty. Whereas the marginal rate does not necessarily exceed the minimum
bid rate if the allotment is certain, there are several mechanisms that induce banks
to bid at higher rates than the minimum bid rate if the allotment is uncertain.
The main source of uncertainty in Va¨lima¨ki’s model is the fact that one bank
does not know the bid rates and volumes of the other banks. In his model, he
translates this uncertainty into the uncertainty about the allotment ratio at the
marginal rate. Based on individual banks’ cost minimization he concludes that the
expected bid volumes and the probability of bidding at rates above the marginal
rate are an increasing function in the individual targeted refinancing volume in the
MRO. This results from the fact that banks are assumed to face convex costs when
actual allotment deviates from the desired allotment volume. Such a cost convexity
is likely to result from risk aversion, from market frictions or capital adequacy
requirements. All in all, his model predicts that higher allotment volumes lead to
more aggressive bidding, i.e. bid rates and bid volumes tend to be higher.
Similarly, Neyer and Wiemers (2004) show in a model on the overnight interbank
market that the EONIA depends positively on total liquidity needs of banks. Their
result is driven by increasing marginal costs of banks of refinancing in the interbank
market. Applied to our analysis, this would mean that a higher aggregate liquidity
deficit of the complete banking sector would induce a more aggressive bidding
behaviour. Consequently, the marginal rate would rise and entail a higher EONIA
rate. Since the size of the liquidity deficit has increased steadily since March
11
2004 and, in addition, the allotment volume has doubled with the introduction
of the new operational framework, the trend of the liquidity deficit is a potential
candidate that could explain the increase in the EONIA spread.11 These theoretical
considerations are underlined by comments the ECB received in response to a
public consultation of banks concerning their attitude towards the changes in the
operational framework. Some of the banks expressed concerns about a higher
liquidity risk in case bidders receive a zero allotment.12
According to Va¨lima¨ki’s model, the uncertainty of a bank about the bidding be-
haviour of other banks is a necessary condition for banks to bid at rates higher than
the minimum bid rate. To approximate this uncertainty, we introduce a variable
liquidity uncertainty, which is derived as the conditional volatility from cumulated
average reserve fulfilment during a maintenance period. In the case of increased
uncertainty about the allotment at the marginal rate in particular and aggregate
liquidity uncertainty in general, banks may intuitively wish to avoid going out
with empty hands from the auction and hence bid at higher rates. Consequently,
banks may engage in so-called safety bids, bidding at higher rates to insure against
the risk of not obtaining the desired liquidity which in turn translates into higher
overnight rates. In this sense a higher EONIA spread reflects a liquidity risk pre-
mium that banks are willing to pay if there is uncertainty over their individual
allotments from the tender operation. Following this reasoning, we also want to
examine if liquidity uncertainty indeed leads to an increase in the EONIA spread.
Interest rate expectations
The changes in the operational framework mainly aimed at eliminating the influ-
ence of interest rate expectations in determining the EONIA. While there has been
ample evidence for the impact of interest rate expectations on the EONIA under
the old framework, the evidence for the new framework period seems to be less
obvious so far.13 To shed further light on this issue, we include several variables
11See Figures 6 and 7 in Appendix A for illustration.
12Compare ECB Public Consultation, Summary of comments received on the measures pro-
posed to improve the operational framework for monetary policy, 23 January 2003.
13Under the old framework, interest rate expectations exerted particular impact during the
so-called underbidding episodes documented for example in Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev
(2004). Nautz and Offermanns (2007a) explain EONIA dynamics using the EONIA spread as
12
related to interest rate expectations.
First, the spread between one-week swap rates and the ECB policy rate represents
the within maintenance period rate expectations commercial banks face when par-
ticipating in MROs, which have a maturity of one week in the new framework
period. High within period rate expectations would increase the willingness to
bid at higher rates since refinancing in the interbank market would become rel-
atively costly. As a consequence, we expect a positive relationship between the
swap spreads and the EONIA spread.
Also, one-week swap rates send a signal about the expected tender rate of the
auction. According to the auction literature, the uncertainty about the expected
value of the auctioned good may also be relevant for the auction outcome. In this
context, theories of bidding behaviour describe the phenomenon of the ”winner’s
curse”. It originates from the theory about common value auctions where a good
whose real value is unknown is sold. The average of all bids may show a correct
valuation, but by the nature of the auction, the winner placed the highest bid and
thus turns out to have overvalued the good more than the others. Rational bidders
should be aware of this possible overvaluation in advance. If the signals about the
true value of the auction are relatively clear bidders feel more comfortable and
see less need to adjust their prior estimates. If, however, the signals are diffuse,
they will revise their bids downwards. In consequence, a higher uncertainty would
strengthen the winner’s curse effect, leading to a downward-correction of bids in
common value auctions. ECB auctions have a common value character insofar as
there exists a liquid and competitive market for central bank funds. A private
value component is introduced because banks differ in terms of creditworthiness or
size, which influence transaction costs in the interbank market or the access and
cost of collateral necessary for MROs. This private value component would dilute
the winner’s curse effect in ECB auctions. Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004)
find no evidence for the winner’s curse in ECB main refinancing operations for a
one-year period from June 2000 to June 2001. Linzert, Nautz and Bindseil (2007)
well as the term spread (spread between the 3m EURIBOR and the minimum bid rate). Most
interestingly they find the term spread - understood to reflect interest rate expectations - to be
a significant contributor to the EONIA dynamics, even under the new framework.
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study bidder behaviour in longer-term refinancing operations and show that the
winner’s curse affects bid volume, bid rates and the participation in the tender.
To test for the existence of the winner’s curse, we define a variable interest rate
uncertainty, which is represented by the conditional volatility of the first difference
in one-week swap rates, and analyze if it has a diminishing effect on the spread.
In addition, rate expectations of the subsequent period defined as the spread be-
tween forward rates one month in one month and the minimum bid rate (policy
rate expectations) might be one reference point for the EONIA. If, for example,
banks expect interest rates to be cut in the current maintenance period, it would
be more favourable to postpone the fulfilment of the reserves. Neyer (2004) shows
on a theoretical basis that, while an influence of policy rate expectations on bid-
ding behaviour used to be immanent under the old framework, it should have been
eliminated in the new framework period by the non-overlapping MRO-periods and
the strict implementation of interest rate changes at the beginning of a mainte-
nance period. So we analyze in particular whether her theoretical result applies,
which predicts that there is a positive significance of policy rate expectations in the
old framework period and that it vanishes in the new framework period. For the
period of the old framework, empirical evidence as from Wu¨rtz (2003)14 supports
the relevance of interest rate expectations for the EONIA. Nautz and Offermanns
(2007b) find that the EONIA rate significantly adjusts to the forward spread except
for the last week of a maintenance period in both framework periods.
Finally, the lagged EONIA spread is supposed to represent past interest rate ex-
pectations. According to the martingale hypothesis, the interest rate tomorrow
should equal today’s expected level for tomorrow in the absence of market fric-
tions,15 i.e. it −Et(it+1) = 0. Otherwise there would exist intertemporal arbitrage
possibilities. Since existing evidence suggests that the Martingale hypothesis does
not hold for the euro zone16 and since liquidity conditions are expected to play
a role for the EONIA, it is natural to add further variables that contribute to
explaining the behaviour of banks or to record unforeseen shocks.
14Wu¨rtz (2003) distinguishes additionally for interest rate cut and hike expectations.
15Compare Hamilton (1996).
16Compare for example Perez-Quiros and Mendizabal (2006), Ejerskov et al. (2003).
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Novelties of the new framework
To give an overview, we summarize the three major changes of the new framework
and their probable impact on the link between the explanatory variables and the
endogenous one. First, MRO tender periods are reduced from two weeks to one
week so that periods no longer overlap. As a consequence, MRO volumes doubled.
This should have the effect that banks are more sensitive to variables related to
liquidity needs, as indicated in Table 2. Second, more transparency with regard to
the publication of autonomous factor forecasts and benchmark allotment should
enable banks to make more precise assessments and react to misalignments of
actual versus forecasted values. And third, policy rate changes become effective
only with the first MRO of a maintenance period. This should imply that longer-
term interest rate expectations become irrelevant.
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical predictions of the explanatory variables on the
EONIA spread.
Table 2: Theoretical predictions: Summary
Increase in explanatory variable Notation Predicted influence
Liquidity policy l(mrot) -
Errors in autonomous factors* e(af)t−1 +
Reserve fulfilment rft−1 -
Bid-to-cover ratio* b(mrot) +
Liquidity deficit* dt +
Liquidity uncertainty* σl,t−1 +
Within period rate expectations swst +
Policy rate expectations fst 0 (NFW) / + (OFW)
Lagged policy spread st−1 +
Interest rate uncertainty σi,t -
Expected FTO fto(mp
−1) -
Notes: * Here, the effect may be weaker under the old framework (OFW) compared to the
new framework (NFW). Table 7 in Appendix B explains the construction of the variables.
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4 Empirical Model and Results
Our model specification is mainly based onWu¨rtz (2003), who assesses an EGARCH
model explaining the spread and its volatility. Since volatility was rather moderate
and not an issue of concern during our sample period, we use a more structural
approach to model the mean of the EONIA spread. Possible dynamics within a
period are incorporated by allowing for a different reaction of the EONIA on the
days before and after the last MRO. Non-structural movements as calendar effects
or other outliers are corrected by dummy variables. End-of-period observations17
are completely excluded from the analysis. We analyze a daily model of the spread
by OLS as presented in the following equation
st = const+ α1st−1 + α2swst + α3fst + α4l(mrot) + α5l(mrot)|lastMRO
+ α6b(mrot) + α7rft−1 + α8e(af)t−1 + α9dt + α10σi,t + α11σl,t−1
+ α10fto(mp−1) + α11fto(mp−1)|lastMRO + v(d) + εt.
4.1 Estimation Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results. As it can be seen liquidity policy
(l(mrot)) in MROs has a statistically significant impact on the EONIA spread. In
accordance with the hypothesis, only a loose allotment in the last MRO
(l(mrot)|LMRO) of a maintenance period has the intended effect of reducing the
spread. In this sense, an allotment of one billion euro above benchmark in the
last MRO decreases the spread by four basis points. In contrary, allotment above
benchmark within the maintenance period does not play an important role because
it will not necessarily remain constant during the current period. Both results are
valid for the periods of the old and the new framework. The results also hold in
the case of a liquidity absorbing FTO at the last day of the maintenance period. A
comparable result is found by Moschitz (2004). He shows that an additional supply
of reserves of one billion euro reduces the interbank rate by eight basis points, if
17I.e. the last day of a period. To check the robustness of the results, Table 10 in Appendix C
presents results including end-of-period observations.
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the change is expected to remain effective until the end of the maintenance period.
In our model, this would correspond to the last MRO.18
Table 3: Benchmark equation new framework period
Dependent variable: st = EONIA - MBR
const -1.153 l(mrot) 0.007 σi,t -8.601
(-4.64) (4.00) (-3.97)
st−1 0.128 l(mrot)|LMRO -0.038 σl,t−1 6.205
(2.62) (-5.83) (2.82)
swst 0.214 b(mrot) 0.037 fto(mp−1) 0.001
(3.27) (2.44) (3.08)
fst 0.004 rft−1 -0.144 fto(mp−1)|LMRO -0.002
(0.20) (-2.40) (-3.46)
dt 0.101 e(af)t−1 0.212
(5.08) (3.43)
R2 0.59
Notes: Estimations without last day of maintenance period. HAC consistent
t-values in parentheses. More detailed estimation results and detailed explana-
tions of variables in Appendix C.
Table 4: Benchmark equation old framework period
Dependent variable: st = EONIA - MBR
const 0.066 l(mrot) 0.005 σi,t -0.025
(0.22) (2.03) (-2.28)
st−1 0.425 l(mrot)|LMRO -0.039 σl,t−1 0.298
(6.39) (-5.97) (0.06)
swst 0.143 b(mrot) 0.005 b(mrot) ∗ d(ubd) -0.048
(3.35) (1.67) (-6.76)
fst 0.067 rft−1 -0.252 d(ubd) 0.203
(2.59) (-3.56) (6.12)
dt 0.015 e(af)t−1 0.039
(0.52) (0.57)
R2 0.72
Notes: Estimations without last day of maintenance period. HAC consistent
t-values in parentheses. d(ubd): Dummy for underbidding episodes, more de-
tailed estimation results and detailed explanations of variables in Appendix
C.
18Note, that the equation includes the lagged policy spread as well as the liquidity supply
variable. One might assume that liquidity supply reacts to past values of the EONIA spread and
that consequently, the lagged spread and the liquidity policy variable are correlated. However,
robustness checks show that the estimated coefficients for the liquidity policy variable remain
robust, whether the lagged EONIA spread is included or not.
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As presumed, tight liquidity conditions at the interbank market as signaled by pos-
itive errors in autonomous factor forecasts, high bid-to-cover ratios or low reserve
fulfilments exert an upward pressure on the EONIA spread.
Compared to the old framework period, the EONIA spread reacts more sensi-
tively to liquidity conditions as indicated by errors in autonomous factors or the
bid-to-cover ratio in the new framework period. As outlined in Section 3, this
may be related to the fact that the maturity structure of the old framework pro-
vided more flexibility for banks regarding the refinancing opportunities. Also,
the increased transparency of the publication of autonomous factor forecasts and
benchmark allotment may have made it easier for banks to asses the prevailing
liquidity conditions and therefore to react faster and more precisely compared to
the old framework.
Given this increase in information, liquidity shocks as for example errors in au-
tonomous factors e(af)t−1 are more clearly identified by market participants. The
positive impact errors in autonomous factor forecasts have on the EONIA spread
can therefore be seen as an improvement of the market’s perception of temporary
liquidity shocks and allowing banks to react adequately. This result is supported
by the fact that there is a stronger influence of errors in forecasts of autonomous
factors on the EONIA spread under the new framework compared to the old frame-
work.
As the theoretical considerations suggest, the bid-to-cover ratio (b(mrot)) has a
significantly positive influence on the EONIA spread in the new framework period.
This is plausible because a high bid-to-cover ratio reflects the fact that liquidity
demand has only been met to a low degree by the ECB. In the old framework
period, the evidence on the bid-to-cover ratio is less clear. As is shown in Table 4,
we corrected for the underbidding episodes (d(ubd) and b(mrot) ∗ d(ubd)), which
occurred in the old framework period. In these cases, interest rate cut expectations
led to extreme underbidding in MROs. As a consequence, banks could not cover
their liquidity needs in the MRO and the EONIA rate soared in spite of interest
rate cut expectations and a low bid-to-cover ratio. Accordingly, these episodes are
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shown in the estimations with a significantly negative sign. Although we separated
out these particular underbidding episodes, the evidence of a significant influence
of the bid-to-cover ratio is weaker under the old compared to the new framework.
This may be related to the fact that, given the overlapping character of MROs,
the bid-to-cover ratio may have a weaker signalling character. Note also, that the
bid-to-cover ratio in the old framework period is defined as the average value of
the current and previous MRO.
The average reserve fulfillments (rft−1), have a significantly negative impact on
the EONIA spread. This supports the presumption that high past reserve holdings
reduce the EONIA spread which appears self-evident against the background of
high past reserve holdings creating little pressure on the reserves for the remaining
days within the period. Note that in the old framework period, banks reacted
more sensitively to past fulfilment of reserves. This illustrates that, given the
same amount of past reserve fulfilment, banks feel less comfortable under the new
framework compared to the old framework.
The hypothesis by Va¨lima¨ki (2006), which predicts that an increasing total liquidity
deficit (dt) exerts pressure on the spread, is supported by the results in the period
of the new framework. This confirms the notion that the risk of receiving no
liquidity in the tender is likely to increase as the banks’ desired liquidity grows.
In fact, the finding is in line with results from analyzing banks’ bidding behavior
where the aggregate size of allotment has been found to significantly determine the
marginal rate of the auction. Interestingly, this variable does not play a significant
role under the old framework. The result could be brought in accordance with
the model of Va¨lima¨ki (2006) in the sense that allotment uncertainty as a crucial
variable for the tender outcome is the necessary condition for the liquidity deficit
being significant. Given the liquidity buffer banks had in the old framework period,
allotment uncertainty may have existed but may have played a less important role
for the bidding decision of banks.
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Uncertainty about the liquidity situation (σl,t−1), which is represented by the con-
ditional variance of reserve fulfillment of banks, has both a positive and significant
effect on the spread. It appears that in the presence of higher uncertainty about
the liquidity situation, banks are willing to pay a risk premium that secures their
liquidity provision. This finding is in line with Va¨lima¨ki’s model, which incor-
porates liquidity uncertainty as a decisive variable for the emergence of a tender
spread. Like the liquidity deficit, liquidity uncertainty has not been found to be
of significance under the old framework.
Our findings concerning policy rate expectations (fst) underpin the theoretical
implications from Neyer (2004). During the new framework period, policy rate
expectations apparently do not influence banks’ behaviour in the tender opera-
tions or in the interbank market. In contrast, they have a positive and significant
impact on the spread in the sample period for the old framework period. Hence, it
appears that the changes to the operational framework had their intended effect,
eliminating policy rate expectations from the bidding behavior in the MROs and
thus also from the determination of the overnight market rate.
Within period rate expectation (swst) as measured by the spread between one-week
swap rates and the minimum bid rate are — as expected — positively related
to the development of the EONIA spread. This confirms the presumption that
interest rate expectations up to the following MRO induce banks to accept higher
refinancing costs in the current MRO. Notice, however, that the various interest
rate measures used in the empirical analysis are interlinked during the last week
of a maintenance period. This makes it difficult to separate the effects into within
period rate expectations and policy rate expectations. Therefore, the relevance of
interest rate expectations in the overnight market cannot be ruled out completely.
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The negative coefficients of interest rate uncertainty (σi,t), defined as the condi-
tional volatility of the first difference in one-week swap spreads, suggests that the
phenomenon of the winner’s curse is relevant in both sample periods, i.e. banks
bids are increasingly cautious as they are uncertain about the future interest rate.
Note, that there was less interest rate uncertainty under the new framework com-
pared to the old framework.
A further interesting insight is provided by the market’s expectations about an
FTO (fto(mp
−1)). This variable illustrates the fine tuning operation of the pre-
vious maintenance period. During the course of the new framework period, FTOs
took place increasingly systematically on the last day of a maintenance period.
Consequently, a bank should take this policy into account for its reserve manage-
ment. The regression results show that expectations about a liquidity injecting
FTO only mitigate pressure on the EONIA during the last week of a maintenance
period (fto(mp
−1)|LMRO).
4.2 Economic Significance
In order to get a better understanding of which factors may have contributed to
the overall rise of the EONIA spread since the introduction of the new framework,
it is useful to quantify the contributions of each variable to the increase in the
overall spread. Figure 5 summarizes the economic significance of the estimation
results. The increase of the EONIA spread from the first part of the sample period
compared to the second part of the sample by two basis points is divided according
to the contributions by the different variables in the analyzed model.19
19The division of the sample period is not supposed to suggest a structural break in the
new framework period. It is rather meant to provide an assessment about the quantitative
contributions of the widening of the spread.
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Figure 5: Individual contributions to the widening of the spread in the new
framework period
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Notes: Quantitative contributions of the determinants to the widening of the spread of 2 bp from March 2004 
to August 2005 versus September 2005 to August 2006. Individual contributions are calculated as partial 
influence of the respective variable on the EONIA spread multiplied by average change of the variable from 
the first to the second part of the sample.  
As it is apparent from Figure 5, the most important driving force on the EONIA
spread is the liquidity deficit. On average, the increase in the liquidity deficit
has led to an increase in the EONIA spread by 1.45 basis points. Other relevant
variables affect the spread more within the maintenance period. In this model,
banks’ fulfilment of reserve is shown to play a crucial role. Interestingly, the
liquidity policy by the ECB did not play a very significant role in the overall
determination of the EONIA spread contributing to a reduction in the EONIA
spread of 0.04 basis points. Moreover, errors in the forecasts of autonomous factors
affect the EONIA spread significantly. Since the forecast quality of autonomous
factors has been relatively similar in both parts of the sample, the quantitative
effect is not very strong.
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5 Conclusions
The spread between the EONIA and the ECB’s policy rate has widened slowly
but steadily since the introduction of the changes to the operational framework in
March 2004. To limit the increase in the spread, the ECB adopted a loose liquidity
policy towards the end of the year 2005. The spread decreased somewhat during
2006 while increasing again towards the end of the year.
The results from the empirical analysis can be summed up follows: A rise in
the liquidity deficit significantly increases the EONIA spread. Moreover, tight
liquidity conditions as well as an increase in banks’ uncertainty about the liquidity
conditions exert a significant upward pressure on the spread. ECB’s liquidity policy
has a significant impact on the reduction of the spread, however, this is only the
case when a loose policy is conducted in the last MRO of the maintenance period.
Policy rate expectations (as measured by the forward rate spread) have not been
found to be relevant, while within period rate expectations (as measured by the
1w swap spread) were found to have a significant impact on the spread. Notice,
however, that separating the two effects is difficult.
In terms of the historical contribution to the overall increase of the spread, the
results demonstrate that the increase in the EONIA spread can for the largest
part be explained by the current liquidity deficit. The ECB’s loose liquidity policy
has contributed to a (small) reduction in the spread. More indirectly it may have
induced banks to front-load their reserve holdings contributing to a reduction in
the spread.
With regard to possible implications for monetary policy implementation it seems
crucial to break the upward trend and reduce the overall liquidity deficit to alleviate
pressure on the EONIA spread. Since the increase in the liquidity deficit goes
along with an increase in refinancing volumes in MROs, allowing banks to receive
liquidity in alternative refinancing such as LTROs might contribute to mitigating
the effect of the increasing liquidity deficit.20 Moreover, it appears to be central
20Note that some counterparties made this argument during the public consultation on the
changes to the operational framework.
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to further increase the transparency and the clarity of the operational framework
to reduce banks’ uncertainty about the liquidity situation as much as possible.
Finally, the results suggest that the liquidity policy, particularly when conducted
in the last operation of the maintenance period, is an effective tool to reduce the
EONIA spread.
In total, the results suggest that structural factors related to the design of the
central bank’s balance sheet and the operational framework can have an impact
on the EONIA spread. While liquidity policy remains to be an important tool,
more structural measures may be more effective than discretionary liquidity man-
agement.
Looking forward, exploiting the link between the marginal rate and the EONIA,
it seems crucial to further examine bidding behaviour in the main refinancing
operations that will be key to understand the determination of the equilibrium rate
in these operations.21 This would allow to analyze how bank-specific behaviour, as
for example the individual use of collateral or strategic bidding by certain banks,
spills over into the overnight market.
21See Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004), Linzert, Breitung and Nautz (2006), Linzert,
Bindseil and Nautz (2007) and Linzert and Weller (2006) for studies on bidding behaviour in
central bank auctions.
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A Liquidity Deficit
Figure 6: Liquidity deficit from demand side
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Time series: Liquidity deficit (black line), deficit from autonomous factors (grey line) and
reserve requirements (dashed line). The vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the new
framework.
Figure 7: Liquidity deficit from supply side
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Time series: Liquidity deficit (black line), outstanding MROs (grey line) and outstanding
LTROs (dashed line). The vertical line corresponds to the introduction of the new framework.
The liquidity deficit and its components from the demand side, reserve require-
ments and autonomous factors, are depicted in Figure 6. The variable is mainly
driven by the development of autonomous factors, which have declined before the
introduction of the euro as a cash currency in January 2002 and have steadily
increased again. Figure 7 shows the composition from the supply side. As it can
be seen, MROs account for about 75 percent of all liquidity supply and LTROs for
about 25 percent.
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B Unit Root Tests
Estimated equation:
∆St = φ0 − ρSt−1 + γt+ εt.
where
ρ = 1− φ1
Table 5: Results unit root tests, old framework versus new framework
Old framework New framework, with trend New framework, without trend
φ0 0.03*** φ0 0.03*** φ0 0.03***
φ1 0.71*** φ1 0.29*** φ1 0.40***
γ — γ 2.66E-05**
Notes: ***/** indicate significance at the 1%/5%-level. — indicates no significance.
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that the importance of the lagged spread has decreased
under the new framework compared to the old framework. In addition, a positively
significant time trend is found in the new framework period. In summary, the
relationship between the spread and previous values has become less close under
the new framework compared to the old framework.
Table 6: Results unit root tests, new framework
March 2004 - September 2005 October 2005 - August 2006
Including a trend Without trend
φ0 0.03*** φ0 0.03*** φ0 0.03***
φ1 0.32*** φ1 0.33*** φ1 0.62***
γ 6.11E-05** γ —
Notes: ***/** indicate significance at the 1%/5%-level. — indicates no significance.
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Table 7: List of variables
EONIA spread s Spread between EONIA and Minimum Bid Rate (MBR)
Within period rate expectations sws Spread bw. one-week swap rates and MBR, EONIA swap
rates as mean bw. bid and ask prices, quoted at noon
Policy rate expectations fs Spread bw. forward rates one month in one month and MBR
Forward rates one month in one month = 2*(swap
rate(2 months) - swap rates(1 month), quoted at noon
Liquidity policy l(mrot) actual minus benchmark allotment of current MRO
Bid-to-cover ratio b Bid-to-cover ratio of current MRO in the new framework,
average of the two most recent MROs in the old framework
Reserve fulfilment rf Current account holdings divided by reserve
requirements, cumulated average since beginning of period
Errors in autonomous factors e(af) Relative forecast error of realized autonomous factors
compared to assumptions for benchmark allotment
cumulated average during a MRO-period
Liquidity deficit d Log of sum of all open market operations
Interest rate uncertainty σi Uncertainty about EONIA rate at one-week horizon:
Conditional volatility of ∆(one-week swap rates)
Liquidity uncertainty σl Conditional volatility of cumulated average reserve holdings
Expectations of an FTO fto(mp
−1) Volume of FTO allotment in preceding maintenance period
Dummies v(d) Vector of Dummy variables for FTOs, end of period,
calendar effects and extreme outliers
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C Robustness Checks
Our benchmark equation (Table 8) shows the result that the liquidity deficit is one
the most important driving forces behind the widening of the EONIA spread. To
make sure that it might not be a simple time trend (Table 9) that drives the spread,
we add a time trend to the benchmark equation. It proves to be insignificant and
therefore supports the specification of the benchmark equation.
Since the aim of our analysis is not to model end-of-period effects, we exclude
end-of-period observations from the benchmark equation. Table 10 shows what
happens if we alternatively include the very last day of the period as a step dummy.
The last day of period is divided into three categories: last day without FTO, with
a liquidity absorbing FTO or with a liquidity injecting FTO. Our results remain
robust, only the significance of one-week swap spreads can be modelled less clearly.
Since adding end-of-period observations does not improve the explanatory content
of the estimation, our benchmark equation is confirmed.
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Table 8: Benchmark equation new framework
Dependent variable: st = EONIA - MBR
const -1.153 (d(eow)) -0.006
(-4.64) (-2.28)
st−1 0.128 (d(eom)) 0.023
(2.62) (4.57)
swst 0.214 (d(eoq)) 0.026
(3.27) (2.71)
fst 0.004 (d(eos)) 0.017
(0.20) (1.53)
l(mrot) 0.007 (d(eoy)) 0.096
(4.00) (3.52)
l(mrot)|LMRO -0.038 (d(5Apr04)) 0.232
(-5.83) (50.72)
b(mrot) 0.037 (d(8Oct04)) 0.277
(2.44) (63.19)
rft−1 -0.144 (d(3Dec04)) -0.185
(-2.40) (-15.21)
dt 0.101
(5.08)
e(af)t−1 0.212
(3.43)
σi,t -8.601
(-3.97)
σl,t−1 6.205
(2.82)
fto(mp
−1) 0.001
(3.08)
fto(mp
−1)|LMRO -0.002
(-3.46)
Adjusted R2 0.59
Notes: End-of-period observations are excluded from the estimation. HAC
consistent t-values in parentheses. The second column shows dummy variables
for end of week (d(eow)), end of month (d(eom)), end of quarter (d(eoq)), end
of semester (d(eos)), end of year (d(eoy)) and some special outliers of more
than three times a standard deviation.
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Table 9: Robustness check: Results including a time trend
Dependent variable: st = EONIA - MBR
const -1.341 (d(eow)) -0.006
(-2.10) (-2.30)
st−1 0.127 (d(eom)) 0.023
(2.61) (4.51)
swst 0.213 (d(eoq)) 0.026
(3.25) (2.71)
fst 0.007 (d(eos)) 0.016
(0.32) (1.42)
l(mrot) 0.007 (d(eoy)) 0.096
(4.00) (3.53)
l(mrot)|LMRO -0.037 (d(5Apr04)) 0.232
(-5.84) (46.52)
b(mrot) 0.037 (d(8Oct04)) 0.277
(2.42) (64.84)
rft−1 -0.141 (d(3Dec04)) -0.185
(-2.32) (-15.14)
dt 0.116 trend 1.14E-05
(2.32) (-0.33)
e(af)t−1 0.216
(3.49)
σi,t -8.588
(-3.94)
σl,t−1 5.893
(2.89)
fto(mp
−1) 0.001
(3.07)
fto(mp
−1)|LMRO -0.002
(-3.46)
Adjusted R2 0.59
Notes: End-of-period observations are excluded from the estimation. HAC
consistent t-values in parentheses. The second column shows dummy variables
for end of week (d(eow)), end of month (d(eom)), end of quarter (d(eoq)), end
of semester (d(eos)), end of year (d(eoy)) and some special outliers of more
than three times a standard deviation.
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Table 10: Robustness check: Results including end-of-period effects
Dependent variable: st = EONIA - MBR
const -1.201 (d(eow)) -0.006
(-4.79) (-2.26)
st−1 0.127 (d(eom)) 0.023
(2.70) (4.40)
swst 0.129 (d(eoq)) 0.025
(1.78) (2.42))
fst -0.001 (d(eos)) 0.017
(-0.03) (1.36)
l(mrot) 0.008 (d(eoy)) 0.091
(4.69) (3.56)
l(mrot)|LMRO -0.038 (d(eop, noFTO)) 0.018
(-6.49) (0.32)
b(mrot) 0.045 (d(eop, labFTO)) -0.039
(2.84) (-1.59)
rft−1 -0.173 (d(eop, lprFTO)) 0.031
(-2.87) (1.99)
dt 0.107 (d(5Apr04)) 0.232
(5.46) (55.27)
e(af)t−1 0.213 (d(6Apr04)) 0.675
(3.31) (11.76)
σi,t -7.987 (d(8Jun04)) -0.333
(-3.46) (-5.81)
σl,t−1 5.935 (d(6Jul04)) 0.456
(2.63) (8.06)
fto(mp
−1) 0.001 (d(9Aug04)) -0.426
(3.26) (-17.22)
fto(mp
−1)|LMRO -0.002 (d(8Oct04)) 0.276
(-3.46) (63.24)
(d(11Oct04)) 0.665
(11.46)
(d(3Dec04)) -0.187
(-16.27)
(d(7Jun05)) -0.271
(-10.50)
Adjusted R2 0.78
Notes: End-of-period observations are excluded from the estimation. HAC
consistent t-values in parentheses. The second column shows dummy variables
for end of week (d(eow)), end of month (d(eom)), end of quarter (d(eoq)), end
of semester (d(eos)), end of year (d(eoy)). End-of-period dummies include
dummies without FTOs ((d(eop, noFTO))), with liquidity absorbing FTOs
((d(eop, labFTO))) and liquidity providing FTOs ((d(eop, lprFTO))).
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Table 11: Benchmark equation old framework
Dependent variable: st = EONIA - MBR
const 0.066 (d(eow)) 0.013
(0.22) (1.53)
st−1 0.425 (d(eom)) 0.068
(6.39) (6.54)
swst 0.143 (d(eoq)) 0.011
(3.35) (0.337)
fst 0.067 (d(eos)) 0.168
(2.59) (2.91)
l(mrot) 0.005 (d(eoy)) -0.122
(2.03) (-2.05)
l(mrot)|LMRO -0.039 d(ubd) 0.203
(-5.97) (6.12)
b(mrot) 0.005 (d(end2000)) 0.203
(1.67) (8.41)
b(mrot) ∗ d(ubd) -0.048 (d(easter2001)) 0.466
(-6.76) (11.30)
rft−1 -0.252 (d(Sep2001)) -0.469
(-3.56) (-30.87)
dt 0.015 (d(end2001)) 0.305
(0.52) (5.74)
e(af)t−1 0.039 (d(end2002)) 0.389
(0.57) (11.04)
σi,t -0.025 (d(end2003)) -0.265
(-2.28) (-13.23)
σl,t−1 0.298
(0.06)
Adjusted R2 0.72
Notes: End-of-period observations are excluded from the estimation. HAC
consistent t-values in parentheses. The second column shows dummy variables
for end of week (d(eow)), end of month (d(eom)), end of quarter (d(eoq)), end
of semester (d(eos)), end of year (d(eoy)) and some special outliers of more than
three times a standard deviation. d(ubd): dummy for underbidding episodes.
(d(Sep2001)) : dummy 20 Sep 2001
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